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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the timing of promotions in academic depart-
ments. Contrary to previous attempts in the empirical literature, we test
alternative theories of fast tracks by adding a measure of performance in
our analysis. We ￿nd that learning from past performance is an important
factor to explain the time spent as assistant and associate professor. In
addition, our analysis shows the existence of a handicapping policy: indi-
viduals who had a fast promotion in the past are less likely to be promoted
quickly again. We also ￿nd that the handicap is relative, that it does not
survive the whole career and that it is possible for these individuals to
beat it if they achieve a given level of productivity. We interpret our ￿nd-
ings as evidence that incentives and sorting matter in academia and that
using relative handicaps can help to balance these two concerns. Finally,
we look at the productivity pattern of individuals with di⁄erent career
pro￿les and ￿nd that fast tracks are always more productive than their
pairs, even after the last promotion, what suggests an e⁄ective selection
process.
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11 Introduction
Economists have only recently devoted a lot of attention to careers in orga-
nizations. One speci￿c aspect which has been analyzed is whether there are
systematic fast tracks, i.e. whether agents promoted quickly at one level are
promoted more quickly at the next level. Evidence from sociology [Rosenbaum
(1979), Br￿derl et al. (1991), Podolny and Baron (1997)] and economics [Baker
et al. (1994), Ariga et al. (1999)] suggests that this is the case. But the ques-
tion of why this is observed remains open. Baker et al. (1994) interpret this
￿nding as evidence of learning about individual ability, while Ariga et al. (1999)
suggest that more elaborate models incorporating ￿rm speci￿c human capital
acquisition are needed to explain their results.
In contrast, the theoretical literature has rather studied why organizations
might deliberately choose to favor the winner of the ￿rst round in the second
round of a multi period contest. Several theoretical explanations have been
proposed to explain this feature. The ￿rm can decide to act this way to induce
human capital acquisition [Prendergast (1992)]. Under asymmetric learning, the
￿rm can have incentives to exaggerate promotion prospects. Therefore, a cred-
ible way to signal high ability can be to promote the worker to a more di¢ cult
task. An early promotion reveals information on future promotion prospects
and induces investment in human capital, but at the cost of ine¢ cient task al-
location. Under symmetric learning1, ￿rms can use di⁄erent training policies to
induce human capital accumulation. When wages can not be renegotiated, the
optimal training consists in handicapping the winner of the ￿rst round until the
probability of winning the tournament is 1
2. On the contrary, when wages can
be renegotiated, the winner of the ￿rst round receives more training2.
The ￿rm can also ￿nd it optimal to introduce a bias in favor of the winner
of the ￿rst round to improve the incentives of identical agents in the ￿rst period
[Meyer (1992)]. Even if the bias leads to a loss of incentives in the second period,
it is outweighed by the gain of incentives in the ￿rst period. Biased contests can
1This case is probably more suited to academia where an important dimension of individual
performance, i.e. research, is easily observed.
2The model assumes that talent is more important at the higher rank. This is a credible
assumption in the case of ￿rms but could be dubious in the case of academic departments
where tasks are relatively similar in all hierarchical levels.
2also be optimal for learning purposes. If output is a stochastic function of ability
but not of e⁄ort, a win in the second period by the loser of the ￿rst period is
informative under a positive bias while it is not the case under no bias [Meyer
(1991)]. However, when both learning and incentives matter, these di⁄erent
objectives can be con￿ icting : ￿When the ￿rst-period result is informative about
relative abilities, the e⁄ort-maximizing bias in the second period will typically
favor the ￿rst-period loser, o⁄setting the probable di⁄erence in abilities. (...)
Hence the choice of second period bias might have opposite implications for
employee incentives and for learning by the organization and which employee
should be favored may depend on the relative sensitivity to bias of pre-promotion
and post-promotion pro￿ts￿[Meyer (1992), pp 182-183].
There also exists other potential situations where the bias could favor the
loser [Meyer (1992)]. If the loss of promoting the less able exceeds the gain from
promoting the more able, and if the principal has the choice to promote neither
of the contestants, then the optimal strategy is to set a negative bias for the
leader, and promote him at the end of the second period only if he wins the
second race as well. Otherwise, nobody is promoted.
While the previous papers consider a two period set-up where the timing
of each period is ￿xed, they can nevertheless generate interesting predictions
for the analysis of the timing of careers. In these models, the introduction of
a bias is made by rewarding the winner or the loser of the ￿rst round with
a promotion. When the time spent at a given layer is not ￿xed, a natural
interpretation of these models is to consider that the bias can also be made via
the speed of promotions. For example, a positive [negative] bias is introduced if
a fast promotion at the ￿rst layer implies a fast [slow] promotion at the second
layer.
Our analysis is in the vein of recent empirical exercises that have analyzed
fast tracks using ￿rm￿ s personnel records. Baker et al. (1994) use data of a
medium-sized U.S. ￿rm in a service industry. They show the promotions and
exit rates by tenure at the second level of the hierarchy versus the time to
promotion from the ￿rst to the second level. They ￿nd that ￿holding tenure
constant, promotion rates decrease with tenure in the previous level￿ , providing
evidence of a learning process about the agent￿ s ability. Another empirical paper
that looks at the issue is Ariga et al. (1999). They use personnel data from a
3large Japanese ￿rm in the manufacturing industry. They test econometrically
whether the time spent in a lower level has an in￿ uence on the probability to be
promoted in an upper level. They ￿nd that this variable has a strong, signi￿cant
and negative e⁄ect, what they interpret as evidence of fast tracks. The fast track
e⁄ect survives even when they control for ￿xed e⁄ects, what can be interpreted
as evidence that a pure learning explanation is not the only explanation, but
suggests rather that individuals with higher ability either receive more training
or are allocated to tasks favoring their advancement. This explanation is in line
with the Gibbons and Waldman (1999) building blocks model. The problem
with these two papers is the lack of performance measurement, which impedes
them to test the reasons behind fast tracks. Chiappori et al. (1999) focus on
other speci￿c questions about the timing of promotions, using data of a French
state-owned ￿rm. They consider individuals who have the same position in the
￿rm￿ s hierarchy at date 0 and date 2 but have di⁄erent intermediate careers
at date 1. They propose a test of a property of wage dynamics which is that
late beginners [the ones promoted at the beginning of date 2] exhibit better
career prospects than early starters [the ones already promoted at date 1]. The
advantage of their approach is that their empirical strategy allows them to
overcome the lack of data on individual performance.
These papers have analyzed the personnel policy of large ￿rms in the ￿nan-
cial, manufacturing or public sector. Here we focus on a completely di⁄erent
working environment as we consider the timing of promotion in economic depart-
ments using a sample of top economists. The academic labor market displays
several peculiar aspects that are likely to in￿ uence the promotion policies of the
departments.
The most important feature for our purpose is that research performance is
easily measurable, publicly observable and standard to the profession. We are
therefore able to use performance in our empirical analysis and thus control for
the learning hypotheses, what represents a signi￿cant improvement with respect
to the existing studies. The second characteristics of the academic profession
is that jobs do not tend to vary along the hierarchy. The task assignment
explanation is therefore not likely to play an important role in the promotion
decision, what could reduce the attractiveness of fast tracks. Thirdly, research
represents only one of the tasks of the everyday life of economists, other tasks
4being teaching, administrative duties, etc... If the promotion decision is taken
according to di⁄erent criteria, then the performance dimension which is more
easily observable should receive less weight than would have been optimal in
the absence of the other tasks, in line with the Holmstr￿m and Milgrom (1991)
explanation. But multitasking does not stand as an obvious candidate to a⁄ect
the timing of promotion.
We analyze the timing of promotions for a sample of 323 top economists
and test for the existence of fast tracks. We look whether the time spent at
the ￿rst layer [assistant] has an impact on the time spent at the second layer
[associate], taking into account individual performance. We ￿nd that research
performance is strongly related to the time spent at each layer and that indi-
viduals promoted quickly from assistant to associate professor are less likely to
be promoted quickly from associate to full professor. This result is robust to
the choice of various speci￿cations. The bias set against the faster is however
relative: the individuals who spent one year less than the average in the ￿rst
stage being only handicapped of 6 months in the next stage. We also ￿nd that
individuals can beat this handicap if they are productive enough during the
second stage. We reach similar conclusions when using a broader de￿nition of
fast track and see that the handicap does not survive the whole career, as in-
dividuals quickly promoted in the past are the ones who experience the fastest
careers. These ￿ndings can be explained by a will to balance incentives and
sorting issues, as in an environment where performance is informative about
relative abilities, incentives require a handicapping policy while the opposite is
true for sorting. We o⁄er alternative explanations for our results and propose
simple tests to discriminate between them. We ￿nally look at the impact of
di⁄erent timing of careers on individual performance. We ￿nd that fast tracks
are always more productive than their pairs, even after the last promotion, what
suggests an e⁄ective selection process.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. In
section 3, we analyze the timing of promotions and test for the existence of
fast tracks in our sample, using di⁄erent de￿nitions. Section 4 looks if di⁄erent
career paths lead to di⁄erent behavior in research performance. Finally, section
5 concludes.
52 Data
The main dataset used is described in details in CoupØ et al. (2003). It provides
information about the career and research performance of 652 top academic
economists for the period 1969-1998. For each individual, we know how many
years was spent in each rank before being promoted to the next. In this paper,
we only consider a well de￿ned subset of these individuals. We de￿ne three
conditions to include them in our analysis: (1) they must have become professor
in 1998, (2) they have followed the hierarchical ladder and (3) they have spent
their entire career in universities. This leaves us with 323 individuals.
In academia, the hierarchy resumes to three layers: assistant, associate and
full professor. Therefore, to analyze the timing of promotions and see whether
there exists fast tracks, we need individuals who have already attained the
last layer of the hierarchy. This sampling procedure leads by de￿nition to the
existence of a survival bias. This implies that we can only interpret our ￿ndings
for the subsample of economists studied. Note that the bias is less critical than
it would have been in the case of ￿rms: sooner or later academics attain the last
layer of the hierarchy while this is not true for individuals employed in ￿rms.
Taking only individuals who have followed the hierarchical ladder is used for
simpli￿cation. We have also considered non hierarchical promotions and results
were unchanged. The third conditions is also innocuous.
There is substantial heterogeneity among individuals as to how many years
they spend in a given position, as shown in table 1. For all the individuals who
were promoted to associate professor, the number of years they spent as assistant
professor varies between 1 and 15 years. For individuals who were promoted to
professor, a similar conclusion prevails. Some individuals are promoted quickly
from rank 1 [assistant professor] to rank 2 [associate professor], and similarly
from rank 2 to rank 3 [full professor]. We de￿ne a fast track as someone who is
promoted in a time span equal or lower than 3 years in each of the promotions.
Table 2 reports the proportion of fast track in our sample. This is the case for
12.1% of the individuals. The largest proportion of individuals in our sample
are promoted to the next level in more than three years during the two spells.
6Table 1: Number of Years Spent in Lower Ranks
time as assistant Number of time as associate Number of time as assistant and Number of
professor individuals professor individuals associate professor individuals
(years) (years) (years)
1 9 1 21 2 1
2 21 2 39 3 2
3 59 3 76 4 3
4 65 4 70 5 24
5 71 5 59 6 37
6 53 6 31 7 38
7 32 7 14 8 49
8 9 8 7 9 55
9 1 9 2 10 52
10 1 11 1 11 23
12 1 13 1 12 15







Table 2: Number and Proportion of Fast Tracks
Number of Years as Associate
￿ 3 years > 3 years #
Number of Years ￿ 3 years 39 (12.1%) 50 (15.5%) 89
As Assistant > 3 years 97 (30.0%) 137 (42.4%) 234
136 187 323
7Table 3: Time to Promotion in Level 1 versus Time to Promotion in Level 2
Years at level 1 Years at Level 2 (associate) before promotion
(assistant) Statistics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 +
1 Promotion rate (%) 11 0 0 25 33 50 50 0 100 -
N 1 0 0 2 2 2 1 0 1 0
2 Promotion rate (%) 10 11 24 46 43 25 67 100 - -
N 2 2 4 6 3 1 2 1 0 0
3 Promotion rate (%) 2 21 37 24 64 38 20 50 0 100
N 1 12 17 7 14 3 1 2 0 2
4 Promotion rate (%) 9 8 28 33 54 75 0 67 0 100
N 6 5 15 13 14 9 0 2 0 1
5 Promotion rate (%) 10 16 30 42 50 55 80 0 0 100
N 7 10 16 16 11 6 4 0 0 1
6 Promotion rate (%) 2 6 31 50 53 38 40 67 100 -
N 1 3 15 17 9 3 2 2 1 0
7 Promotion rate (%) 3 13 33 33 33 63 100 - - -
N 1 4 9 6 4 5 3 0 0 0
8 Promotion rate (%) 11 25 0 33 25 67 100 - - -
N 1 2 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 0
9 Promotion rate (%) 100 - - - - - - - - -
N 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 + Promotion rate (%) 0 33 0 50 100 - - - - -
N 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
All Promotion rate (%) 7 13 29 37 50 53 52 54 33 100
N 21 39 76 70 59 31 14 7 2 4
8To provide a ￿rst impression about the link between the two time period
spent in each rank before promotion, we construct a table which shows the
number and promotion rate of individuals promoted to professors ranked by the
number of years that they spent in the lower ranks [table 3]. This table is similar
to table 4 in Baker et al. (1994). Conclusions from this simple exercise are much
less clear cut than the ￿ndings of Baker et al. (1994). Summary statistics do
not tend to favor a policy of systematic fast track, at least when looking at
the raw numbers. However, it is important to control for performance when
assessing the impact of the time spent in a lower rank on the time spent on the
subsequent one. In the next sections, we analyze the timing of promotion, as
well as the determinants and consequences of being fast track.
3 The Timing of Promotions
We ￿rst test whether there exists systematic fast track in our sample of top
economists. We consider that individuals are on a fast track if after having
been promoted quickly at the ￿rst stage [from assistant to associate professor],
they experience again a quick promotion at the next stage [from associate to full
professor].
We use two variables describing a fast promotion from rank 1 [assistant
professor] to rank 2 [associate professor]:
NASTP, the number of years spent as assistant professor
FAST13, a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the individual is promoted from assis-
tant to associate professor in 3 years or less and 0 otherwise
We also introduce two variables to describe a fast promotion from rank 2
[associate] to rank 3 [full professor]:
NASSP, the number of years spent as associate professor
FAST23, a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the individual is promoted from asso-
ciate to professor in 3 years or less and 0 otherwise
9A test for the existence of fast track is to see whether NASTP (or FAST13)
has an e⁄ect on NASSP (or FAST23). We control for the production since
last promotion (PSLP), which we interact with EXP to check whether new
information becomes less valuable as the researcher becomes more experienced,
in line with learning theory. The measure of production that we use is publica-
tions weighted by the impact factor of the journal. The impact factor is equal
to the citations in year t to the articles published in journals J in t-1 and t-2
divided by the number of articles published in J in t-1 and t-2. This re￿ ects the
number of citations that can be expected for an article published in J, measured
one or two years after publications3. We perform the following standard OLS
regressions:









3PSLPi ￿ EXPi + "0
i (2)
and the following probit estimations:









3PSLPi ￿ EXPi + ￿
0
i (4)
where FAST23i = 1 if FAST23￿
i > 0
FAST23i = 0 if FAST23￿
i ￿ 0
Table 4A provides the estimates of the regressions of NASSP [speci￿cation
(1), column 1 and 2] and FAST23 [speci￿cation (2), column 1 and 2]. First, we
see that performance has a signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect on the speed at which
associate professors are promoted full professor: the highest the productivity of
an associate professor, the less years it takes to achieve the promotion to full
professor. We also see that the e⁄ect of performance diminishes with experience
what suggest the existence of a learning process about ability, as predicted by
learning models. Moreover, the sensitivity of the speed of promotions to perfor-
mance vanishes around 7 years and turns negative thereafter. This appears to
3We used this weighting technique because it is one of the most objective de￿nition of
the productivity of academic economists. However, we have performed our analysis with
alternative weighting schemes of publications and the results remained unchanged.
10indicate that learning takes place only the 7 ￿rst years of the career and that
productivity no longer positively in￿ uences the speed of the career afterwards.
Second, we see that NASTP has a negative e⁄ect on NASSP, and FAST13
has a negative e⁄ect on FAST23. Having been promoted quickly in the past
decreases the chances of being promoted quickly in the future. The estimates of
Eq.(1) show that, all other things being equal, an individual who spent one year
less than the average as assistant professor will spend around 6 months more
than the average as associate professor. The negative relationship between the
two timings of promotions indicates that the individuals who were fast at the
￿rst stage are handicapped with respect to their slower pairs at the second stage.
This handicap however is relative and not absolute as the faster academics are
only handicapped in the second stage by 54% of the time that they have gained
in the ￿rst stage. The other speci￿cations lead to similar conclusions. Note
that the most informative speci￿cation is the one testing Eq.(1) as it uses non
dichotomic variables and thus contains more variation.
These ￿ndings are in line with the handicapping theory: a bias is set against
the individuals who have been quick in the past [the ￿winners￿ ] to o⁄set the
likely edge in ability [Prendergast (1991) and Meyer (1992)]. The results also
show that individuals can beat this handicap if they are productive enough dur-
ing the second stage. This could be because the speed of the ￿rst promotion does
not convey enough information about the individual to put him on a fast track
and that the loss of promoting the less able exceeds the gain from promoting
the more able [Meyer (1991)]. Therefore taking into account the performance of
the second stage is needed to decide which individuals should be on a fast track.
We also checked whether this handicapping e⁄ect was holding on when we con-
sidered only individuals in similar departments. This test allows to control for
institution-speci￿c e⁄ect linked to reputation. We ran the same speci￿cation as
in table 4 by category of university4. We found that the time spent as assistant
4Seven categories are de￿ned based on the rankings of economis departments: the top 2
(category 7, Chicago and Harvard), the close contenders (category 6, those ranked between
3rd and 9th), the contenders (category 5, between the 10th and the 24th position), the upper
middle ranked (category 4, those ranked between 25th ad 49th), the lower middle ranked
(category 3, between the 50th and the 100th), the low ranked (category 2, between the 100th
and 300th position) and the very low ranked (category 1, those under the 300th position).
11Table 4A: Do systematic fast tracks exist? - All individuals
(1) (2) (3)
Dep.var.: NASSPi FAST23i NFULLi
NASTPi -0.54￿￿￿ - - 0.18￿￿￿ - - 0.46￿￿￿ -
(-14.36) (8.56) (12.11)
FAST13i - 1.45￿￿￿ 2.07￿￿￿ - -0.40￿￿￿ -0.64￿￿￿ - -0.91￿￿￿
(9.06) (13.47) (-6.23) (-6.70) (-5.65)
PSLPi -0.67￿￿￿ -0.55￿￿￿ -0.17￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.22￿￿￿ 0.02 -0.67￿￿￿ -0.81￿￿￿
(-20.37) (-15.67) (-3.41) (9.17) (8.54) (0.42) (-20.37) (-22.99)
PSLPi*EXPi 0.09￿￿￿ 0.08￿￿￿ 0.03￿￿￿ -0.04￿￿￿ -0.03￿￿￿ -0.01 0.09￿￿￿ 0.10￿￿￿
(27.74) (22.63) (5.06) (-9.48) (-9.66) (-1.12) (27.74) (29.57)
EXPi - - 0.79￿￿￿ - - -0.69￿￿￿ - -
(7.19) (-5.05)
EXPSQi - - -0.02￿￿￿ - - 0.02￿￿￿ - -
(-2.89) (4.67)
Constant 5.92￿￿￿ 2.81￿￿￿ -2.70￿￿￿ - - - 5.92￿￿￿ 8.50￿￿￿
(24.95) (19.43) (-4.49) (24.95) (58.45)
Log likelihood - - - -95.50 -127.26 -111.31 - -
Pseudo R2 - - - 0.57 0.42 0.49 - -
Adj.R2 0.73 0.64 0.73 - - - 0.85 0.80
Nr. Obs. 323
Speci￿cation (1) and (3): OLS estimation, t-stat equivalent in parentheses;***/**
denote resp. signi￿cance at 1%/5%
Speci￿cation (2): probit estimation, marginal changes; t-stat equivalent in parentheses;
***/** denote resp. signi￿cance at 1%/5%
12had a negative e⁄ect on the time spent as associate in all categories of universi-
ties. However, the coe¢ cient was smaller for higher level universities, for which
sorting might be a more important constraint5.
Up to now, we have de￿ned a fast track with respect to the timing of each
subsequent promotions. We could also use a broader de￿nition and consider not
only the time spent at each layer, but the whole time spent to attain the last
level in the hierarchy. What we want to test is if individuals who have been
quickly promoted at the ￿rst stage, despite their handicap, still have a faster
career than the ones who have been slowly promoted at the ￿rst stage. In other
words, does the handicap hold for the whole career?
We use a new variable to describe a fast career: NFULL, the number of years
spent before being promoted to professor. We run the following OLS regressions:









3PSLPi ￿ EXPi + !
0
i (6)
The third speci￿cation of table 4A reports the estimates of the regressions
of NFULL. We can see that the handicap does not survive the whole career.
Individuals who have been quickly promoted in the past are the ones who expe-
rience the fastest careers. Those who have been promoted in the ￿rst stage in
less than four years will have on average a career path nearly one year shorter
than the ones who spent more time at the ￿rst stage. Note also that, as in pre-
vious estimations, performance positively a⁄ects the timing of the career and
that this e⁄ect decreases with experience.
Up to now, we have found that, after the ￿rst stage of the career, the fastest
individuals are handicapped with respect to their slower colleagues. However,
this handicap is relative, it only holds for the second stage and does not spread
to the whole career path. Such a result could be explained by the need to
balance incentives and sorting issues. In an environment where performance
5As an additional test, we also applied the tools of duration analysis. We estimated whether
the duration of the stay as assistant professor has an in￿uence on the hazard rate of leaving the
state of associate professor, i.e. being promoted professor, controlling for the other factors that
we have already considered, in particular production. We used a discrete time proportional
hazard model (Prentice and Gloecker, 1978). Our results were similar to the previous ones.
13is informative about relative abilities, incentives would require a handicapping
policy while the opposite is true for sorting. Therefore, designing handicaps




We have interpreted our previous ￿ndings as evidence of handicapping poli-
cies for incentives and sorting reasons. However, an alternative explanation for
these results could be human capital accumulation. If the accumulation of hu-
man capital is crucial for the ￿rm [in this case the university] and individuals do
not di⁄er much in their accumulation process, then those receiving a fast promo-
tion at the beginning will have accumulated less human capital and will have to
wait longer for their next promotion6. We therefore need to prove whether our
results are due to a handicapping or to a human capital story. We perform the
estimations of Eq.(2) and (4) with experience (EXP) and experience squared
(EXPSQ) to control for the human capital accumulation hypothesis. The esti-
mates of the regressions are reported in table 4A [third column of speci￿cation
(1) and (2)]. We can see that the conclusions are similar than in the previous re-
gressions, even if the magnitude of the coe¢ cient is slightly di⁄erent. However,
we have to be aware of the possible colinearity problems in our speci￿cations
[experience and the timing of promotions being highly correlated].
Another way to test for the human capital hypothesis is the following: if
human capital accumulation is all that matters for career paths, then individu-
als who were slow at the beginning should have better careers than those who
were fast, due to a higher level of human capital7. The NFULL speci￿cation
of previous subsection already showed us that being fast at the beginning leads
to a better career in term of timing. We also look at the most successful aca-
demics [promoted to full professor in less than 7 years] and see what their ￿rst
career path look like. Among the 67 (out of 312) who attain the level of full
professor in less than 7 years, only 27% took more than 3 years to be promoted
6This issue was raised by Baker et al. (1994) and Chappiori et al (1999).
7This test is based on Chappiori, Valentin and SalaniØ (1999).
14associate professor. Moreover, 55% of the quick assistant professors made it to
full in less than 7 years while it was only the case for 8% of the slow assistant
professors. This shows that the most successful individuals have spent few years
at the ￿rst stage while the human capital accumulation hypothesis predicts the
opposite. We therefore conclude that di⁄erences in career pro￿les can not only
be explained by di⁄erences in human capital accumulation.
Tenure
A potential problem that could undermine our results is that, in the previous
regressions, we have considered both tenured and untenured associate profes-
sors. It could be that these individuals exhibit di⁄erent behaviors and that the
only potential candidates for fast tracks are the tenured associate professors
and not the whole sample. Therefore, not discriminating between the two could
have led to biases in our results. To control for this possibility, we run the same
regressions as before but only for the subsample of tenured associate profes-
sors. Estimates are provided in table 4B. We can see that the results remain
unchanged. Di⁄erences in tenure status can thus not explain our results.
Endogeneity issues
In the speci￿cations used for the regressions of table 4A and 4B, we have
used the number of years as assistant professor (NASTP) as an explanatory
variable. If NASTP is determined by the productivity of the individual during
this period and if individual productivity is correlated across time, this could
raise endogeneity issues. To address this problem, we follow a two steps strategy.
First, we regress NASTP over the performance when assistant and performance
interacted with experience (Eq.(7)]. Then, we replace NASTP by its estimated
value, NASTPE, in the estimation of NASSP [Eq.(8)].
NASTPi = ￿0 + ￿1PSLPi + ￿3PSLPi ￿ EXPi + ’i (7)
NASSPi = ￿0 + ￿1NASTPEi + ￿2PSLPi + ￿3PSLPi ￿ EXPi + ￿i (8)
Results are shown in table 5, [1st column of speci￿cation (1)]. We can see
that the e⁄ect is even stronger than before once we control for endogeneity.
15Table 4B: Do systematic fast tracks exist? - Tenured associate
Tenured associate professors only
(1) (2) (3)
Dep.var.: NASSPi FAST23i NFULLi
NASTPi -0.58￿￿￿ - - 0.07￿￿￿ - - 0.42￿￿￿ -
(-8.72) (4.64) (6.36)
FAST13i - 1.56￿￿￿ 1.92￿￿￿ - -0.27￿￿￿ -0.44￿￿￿ - -0.58￿￿
(5.25) (6.65) (-3.71) (-3.39) (-1.99)
PSLPi -0.72￿￿￿ -0.57￿￿￿ -0.29￿￿ 0.10￿￿￿ 0.21￿￿￿ -0.03 -0.72￿￿￿ -0.87￿￿￿
(-13.05) (-9.70) (-2.44) (4.66) (4.50) (-0.27) (-13.905) (-15.00)
PSLPi*EXPi 0.08￿￿￿ 0.07￿￿￿ 0.04￿￿￿ -0.01￿￿￿ -0.03￿￿￿ -0.001 0.08￿￿￿ 0.10￿￿￿
(17.22) (13.64) (3.21) (-4.72) (-5.07) (-0.10) (17.22) (18.48)
EXPi - - 0.71￿￿￿ - - -0.75￿￿￿ -
(2.99) (-2.75)
EXPSQi - - -0.02 - - 0.03￿ -
(-1.31) (1.92)
Constant 6.70￿￿￿ 3.32￿￿￿ -1.62 - - - 6.70￿￿￿ 9.11￿￿￿
(15.91) (13.97) (-1.34) (15.91) (38.70)
Log likelihood - - - -24.48 -39.92 -36.63 - -
Pseudo R2 - - - 0.62 0.38 0.43 - -
Adj.R2 0.76 0.67 0.73 - - - 0.86 0.80
Nr. Obs. 101
Speci￿cation (1) and (3): OLS estimation, t-stat equivalent in parentheses; ***/**
denote resp. signi￿cance at 1%/5%
Speci￿cation (2): probit estimation, marginal changes; t-stat equivalent in parentheses;
***/** denote resp. signi￿cance at 1%/5%
16Table 5: Do systematic fast tracks exist? - 2SLS estimation
(1) (2)
Dep.var.: NASSPi NFULLi
NASTPEi -0.69￿￿￿ - 0.43￿￿￿ -
(-9.70) (5.84)
’i - -0.53￿￿￿ - 0.55￿￿￿
(-9.19) (10.37)
PSLPi -0.54￿￿￿ -0.57￿￿￿ -0.81￿￿￿ -0.73￿￿￿
(-15.97) (-15.90) (-23.65) (-22.18)
PSLPi*EXPi 0.07￿￿￿ 0.08￿￿￿ 0.09￿￿￿ 0.09￿￿￿
(23.13) (22.70) (30.37) (29.42)
Constant 6.37￿￿￿ 3.29￿￿￿ 6.31￿￿￿ 8.08￿￿￿
(17.08) (22.68) (16.62) (60.79)
Nr. Obs. 323
Adj.R2 0.65 0.64 0.80 0.83
OLS estimation, t-stat equivalent in parentheses
***/** denote resp. signi￿cance at 1%/5%
Because the residual ’i represents the unexplained part of the time spent
as assistant, a negative value could be interpreted as a promotion that occurred
earlier than it should have been. This allows us to do an extra test by using the









3PSLPi ￿ EXPi + ￿
0
i (9)
We ￿nd that the ￿rst period noise is negatively related to the time spent
as associate professor [table 5, 2nd column of speci￿cation (1)], again providing
evidence of a handicapping policy. We also performed the same analysis for the
estimations of NFULL and the conclusions were the same as before [table 5,
speci￿cation (2)].
174 Productivity and the Timing of Careers
Up to now, we have analyzed the timing of promotions. In this section, we want
to see if individuals who spent di⁄erent amount of time at each layer have a
di⁄erent behavior in term of productivity. We ￿rst look at the productivity of
individuals after the last promotion [to full professor]. The ￿rst question we
ask is the following: are fast individuals more productive after being promoted
to full professor. In other words, is the early selection e⁄ective? We compare
the average productivity of four groups of individuals: the ones who have spent
less than 4 years in each layer (fast tracks), the ones who have spent less than
4 years at the ￿rst layer and more than 3 years at the second layer (early fast),
the ones who have spent more than 3 years at the ￿rst layer and less than 4
years at the second layer (late fast) and the ones who have spent more than 4
years at each layer (not fast).
Table 6 reports the average productivity three years and ￿ve years after
being promoted full professor. We can see that three years after the promotion
to full professor, the most productive individuals are the fast tracks, followed
by the late fast and then the two other groups. The di⁄erence in means is
statistically signi￿cant for the fast tracks (t-value of 2.0) and for the late fast
(t-value of 2.0). Over a span of ￿ve years, the most productive are still the fast
tracks but we can no longer discriminate between the three other groups (i.e.
the di⁄erence is only statistically signi￿cant for the fast tracks, t-value of 2.9).
These ￿gures show that the individuals who have the most successful careers
are also the ones who are the best performers ex post. Therefore, early selection
appears to be e⁄ective ￿cherry picking￿ .
Another interesting aspect is to see how the productivity of each group
evolves along the career. In ￿gure 1, we ￿rst compare the pro￿le of each of the
four former groups. We can see that the fast tracks are not only the most pro-
ductive individuals ￿ve years after the promotion to professor: they are the most
productive along the whole career. This is especially striking at the beginning of
the career while at the end, di⁄erences vanish. We also use an alternative de￿n-
ition and split the sample in two groups, according to the number of years spent
before being promoted to full professor [7 years being the separation point].
18Table 6: Average productivity and the timing of careers
A. Average productivity on a period of three years after promotion to professor
Number of Years as Associate
￿ 3 years > 3 years
￿ 3 years 5.97 2.75
Number of Years (8.8) (2.9)
As Assistant > 3 years 3.41 2.38
(4.7) (2.0)
Number of individuals: 272
Average productivity: 3.21
standard errors in parentheses
B. Average productivity on a period of ￿ve years after promotion to professor
Number of Years as Associate
￿ 3 years > 3 years
￿ 3 years 9.98 4.60
Number of Years (10.6) (3.5)
As Assistant > 3 years 5.42 4.80
(3.8) (3.27)
Number of individuals: 201
Average productivity: 5.61
standard errors in parentheses
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20Figure 2 shows us that the conclusion is the same using this other de￿nition:
the fast individuals are always the most productive, whatever the year in their
career.
Previously, we have detected the existence of a handicapping policy for the
faster academics of the ￿rst stage and we have shown that these individuals were
able to beat the handicap if they were productive enough during the second
stage. Our interpretation of these results was that the timing of the ￿rst stage
was not informative enough to put an individual on a fast track and that taking
into account other information, as the performance in the second stage, was
needed to take such a decision. The present analysis comforts our previous
argument that the purpose of such a decision was an e⁄ective selection as fast
tracks always exhibit a higher productivity than their pairs.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the timing of promotions in academic depart-
ments. Contrary to previous attempts in the empirical literature, we have tested
alternative theories of fast tracks by adding a measure of performance in our
analysis. We have found that learning from past performance was an important
factor to explain the time spent as assistant and associate professor. In addition,
our analysis has shown the existence of a handicapping policy: individuals who
had a fast promotion in the past were less likely to be promoted quickly again.
We have also seen that the handicap was relative and that it was possible for
these individuals to beat it if they achieved a given level of productivity. When
using a broader de￿nition of being fast in academia, we have shown that the
handicap did not hold for the whole career and that the individuals promoted
quickly at the beginning were also the ones who experienced the fastest and
most successful careers.
We have linked our results to incentives and sorting issues. To set a negative
bias against those promoted quickly in the ￿rst stage can improve incentives
for all contestants and reestablish a balanced contest, as it compensates for the
likely di⁄erences in ability. However, a strong handicap can be detrimental for
21sorting concerns, as it may lead to the selection of inadequate individuals [i.e.
give a promotion ￿rst to the less able]. We have interpreted our ￿ndings as
evidence that incentives and sorting matter in academia and that using relative
handicaps can help to balance these two concerns. We have also taken into
account other potential explanations for our results, as human capital accumu-
lation and tenure. We have shown that, even if they play a role, they can not
explain our results on the timing of careers.
Finally, we have looked at the productivity pattern of individuals with dif-
ferent career pro￿les. We have found that fast tracks are always the most pro-
ductive academics, whatever the year of their career. The di⁄erence is especially
striking at the beginning of their career but they are also more productive than
their pairs after the last promotion, what shows an e¢ cient selection process.
Our analysis suggests the need for richer datasets in order to improve our knowl-
edge of the dynamics of careers.
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